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The  focus of this paper  is prospective rather than retrospective.
Thus  it  concentrates on the future when U.S. policies  and exchange  rates are
likely  to exert pressure for change  in the  Common Agricultural Policy rather
than the  immediate past when developments in  the United States have
generally supported rather  than threatened the CAP.
In the  immediate past U.S. macroeconomic policies, and to a lesser
extent farm policies, have I  believe held up world commodity prices  in terms
of ECU  (the  Community's monetary unit of account).  This has  in turn allowed
the Community to delay adjustments.
Macroeconomic Support
The combination in  the United States of a tight monetary policy and an
expansionary fiscal  stance has bolstered interest rates.  This  in turn has
led to a strong demand for dollars by capital  investors  and a value of the
dollar which has been high in relation to purchasing parity.
The  strength of the  dollar has  raised the prices of commodities  in
terms  of ECU such that  export restitutions  in the  EEC have needed to be less
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1and support  stocks  lower than otherwise.  Because expenditure has been eased
on both these counts the  financial difficulties of the CAP have been
lightened. Consequently a pressure for change,  indeed probably the main
pressure for change, has thus been weakened.  In  the case of cereals  - and
it  is  in  the cereals  that the conflict  in trade will mainly lie  - the
effect has been reinforced by  the Payment in Kind programme.  This further
bolstered prices at a critical  time for  the FEOGA budget.  A  longer
established  further prop has been a set of loan rates aligned to  the boom
export conditions  of the Seventies rather  than the  weak demand of the  early
Eighties.
The Question Posed
Rather than expand on this chain of causation, I propose to  consider
how EEC policies might react to the opposite situation now emerging where a
weaker dollar and greater American exports combine to drive down world
prices of cereals as perceived from the EEC.  The proper way to pose  this
question is  as  follows.  How might  such a change  in world markets  force
changes  in the way trade  is used to  obtain domestic policy objectives?
This  is  to emphasize  that  the EEC  does not have a policy for
agricultural trade to which domestic  interventions might be subjugated.  On
the contrary, EEC  trade policy has little or no independent  life.  It  is  an
outgrowth of domestic policies.  Like most other economic entities,  the EEC
seeks  to  export its problems of agricultural adjustment on to  the world
market.  The  international market is mainly seen as  the residual market  - a
convenient  and comparatively cheap way of getting rid of surpluses.
Constraints  on trade may well cause changes  in domestic policies through the
2budgetary problems to which they lead.  However, specific trade  targets,  for
example  in terms  of export  revenue, market  shares  of levels of self-
sufficiency, are,  suggest, unlikely to play much of a role  in adjustment to
trading conditions.
Normative and Descriptive Aspects
In posing the problem use has been made of  the conveniently ambiguous
word "might".  How might domestic policies  adjust  to markedly lower cereal
prices? This  can be interpreted  in two ways:
1.  How should policies adjust
2.  How would policies  adjust
Each question is considered in turn but with the emphasis  on the positive
-question.
How should the  Common Agricultural  Policy Adjust to Lower World Cereal
Prices?
A significant  fall  in cereal prices and one perceived as  likely to be
long lasting should highlight the basic inefficiency and inequity of the
Common Agricultural Policy.
Inefficiency
The  inefficiency in resource allocation to which a policy of holding
prices  above world levels  leads has been the main focus  of economists'
attention.  The  inefficiencies are  of two kinds:
1.  There is  inefficiency in that  the loss  of satisfaction by
consumers  is  greater  than the  increased returns to  producers.
2.  Resources are retained within agriculture which on certain
assumptions could have a greater social product elsewhere.
3The  size of these  "deadweight" losses,  as might be expected,  is  a
matter  of some controversy,  the main uncertainty being the  level  of world
commodity prices  if there were no  EEC support.  Most commentators, however,
would agree  that  they cannot be less  than ten billion ECC per annum or
approximately nine billion dollars. Politicians, however, are not very
impressed by these potential efficiency gains.  Perhaps they have doubts,  as
well they might, about the  true social opportunity cost of labor at a time
of high structural unemployment.  Perhaps  they believe similar analyses  of
other protected sectors  (such as  steel,  transport, coal or housing) would
show even greater efficiency losses.  Perhaps  the  gains  are  too abstract and
hypothetical.  These doubts have  to a degree communicated themselves  to
economists  in the  Community.  Increasingly our attention is being focussed
on income  transfers which  are of course the meat and drink of politicians.
Inequity  and Ineffectiveness
Following this  approach, the major defects of the CAP that would be
highlighted by a fall  in world cereal prices would be  the enormous  transfer
that  is  made from consumers  to producers.
It  is  not widely recognized that in most years  around two  thirds, of
the  support producers  receive under  the  CAP comes from consumers' pockets.
The annual  transfer is  about forty billion dollars.  This  is  certainly a
staggeringly  large amount.  Can one  say that  this  transfer is  inequitable?
I believe that one can.
The incidence  is  unfair both among payers and recipients.  The burden
of what  is  in  effect a tax on food falls most heavily on those who  spend a
high proportion of their  income  on food.  They are quite  clearly  the poorer
households.  The  CAP bears  rather lightly on higher income households.  On
4the  recipients'  side  there  is  now,  I  believe, fairly  general agreement among
economists that  the  main effect of such price support  is  to  raise  land
values.  The effect  on labour incomes  is minimal,  the main effect here being
to  retain some  labour  that would otherwise  have moved out of agriculture.
It  follows that the main benefit of the price support goes  to  those  farmers,
a high proportion of whose  income  - broadly defined to include capital  gains
- comes  from land holdings.  Price  supports do very little  for small
farmers, for  tenant farmers  or  for farm workers.  The effect of the policy
then is  to  transfer  income  from those whose need for  income can be assumed
to be very urgent, for example State pensioners and single parent  families,
to  land holders and large owner-occupying farmers whom few would consider to
be  in particular need of support.
The agricultural  inequity of this policy within  the EEC is  reinforced
by a strong bias  in protection towards  cereals  and related arable crops and
against livestock products  (especially those other than dairy products).  In
continental Europe,  incidentally, this bias  long predates  the  formation of
the EEC.  Broadly speaking, effective protection is  much higher for cereals
than for livestock products.  Many types  of livestock production are
especially associated with small farms with limited land resources.  So  the
inequity is compounded.  This bias towards cereals may also be judged to
have had largely negative environmental effects  in  terms of visual amenity,
wildlife variety and pollution.
The policy must therefore be  rated ineffective  in giving either fair
prices  to consumers or helping  those with  low farm incomes.  Two of its
avowed objectives are therefore  not met.  Furthermore,  its  effect on
5efficiency  is  largely adverse in  terms of both resource allocation and
externalities.
The  one  objective which the policy more clearly  satisfies is  that of
stability  and security.  By exporting  all  the need for adjustments in
consumption and production due to changes  in output and consumer taste to
other countries,  the EEC  gives a high degree of price stability to both
producers and consumers.  In this respect  the EEC system price support
differs  from that in the United States.  It is  a two price  system.
Most consumers,  if properly informed, would consider the price paid for
this  stability  in terms  of higher average prices unacceptably high.
Security of food supply  in many senses has  certainly been achieved by the
high levels of self-sufficiency  to which the policy has  led.  However,  there
are almost certainly more cost-effective ways of attaining the  same end.
The advantages  in terms of security and stability  are only minor
qualifications to  the general  inequity, inefficiency and ineffectiveness  of
the CAP, especially as  it relates to cereals.
The Preferred Solution
On the broad revision of policy which would make  it more efficient,
more equitable and more effective,  there  is  I believe fairly wide agreement
among economists  (including those  in  the Commission) and indeed among most
thinking people without vested interests in agriculture.  There should be a
marked cut  in support prices especially of cereals  combined with more direct
income  support for  the needy in agriculture.  Needless  to say on the nature
of  this support there  is  less agreement.  Among the  schemes touted are
income  insurance, differential payments,  marketing quotas subsequently
repurchased by the State, education and retaining grants.  The  relative
6merits of these alternatives  is not our  immediate concern.  What needs to be
pointed out  is  that all  these  schemes would per se  involve  increases in
direct public expenditure.  Even more exchequer outlays would be  required
if,  as  is  likely, it were politically necessary to make some once and for
all  compensation to  those vested interests most directly affected by a cut
in  intervention prices.
How Would Policies Adjust?
The  implications  for public expenditure of programmes of direct income
support  largely rule them out as  likely adjustments  to a fall  in world
cereals prices.  The problem of  the Common Agricultural Policy  - insofar as
it  is viewed in anything but purely national terms  - is  seen both by
governments and electorates as  principally one of exchequer cost.
The cost of the policy to  consumers  is  not well appreciated.
Furthermore, farm pressure  groups  are  adept at pointing to  food shortages
like those  seen in Poland or  the  Soviet Union as  the  alternative  to
mercantilist agricultural policies.  Also, interest in food prices as a
political issue has tended to decline with the  rate of inflation.  No doubt
there  are other explanations but whatever the full  range of reasons,  the
consumer interest has simply not yet been mobilized.  Consumer pressure,
therefore, whatever the  lure of world prices, cannot be  relied upon to bring
about radical  change  in the  Common Agricultural  Policy.  Any change which
does  arise  from lower world cereal prices will  come rather  through  the
effect  of public expenditure.  The need to obtain essentially unanimous
agreement among ten countries whose  interests widely diverge will mean any
change  is  unlikely to be  radical.  This factor  is  often not well appreciated
7in the United States, where  the Commission is  commonly  seen to be much more
firmly in  the driving seat than it  is  in reality.  However, past experience
indicates that even small changes  in the CAP will arise not from concern
about efficient resource allocation or the  ineffectiveness  of price  support
as  a means of incomes support or  the  inequity to which it leads  in both
agriculture  and society, but only through EEC revenue  falling short of
expenditure.
The EEC Budgetary Question
The EEC budgetary question is  a fairly involved issue but its essential
features  in the barest of terms  are  as follows.
For most major agricultural commodities  the basic guarantee of producer
prices  in  the Community is  the commitment by public agencies  to buy up at  a
predetermined intervention price and in unlimited quantity such supplies as
are  offered to  them.  Normally, however,  the Commission keeps  the price
above the  intervention level by intervention at  the borders of the
Community.  For commodities  in which the  Community is  in deficit the main
instrument  is  a levy which varies according to the difference between CIF
prices of imported commodities  and a predetermined minimum import price.
For commodities  in surplus a similarly, though less  rigidly determined,
variable export restitution is  used.
The revenue of the EEC  exchequer comes  in part from agricultural import
levies  and also duties on non-agricultural  imports.  (Since  1970 these have
been designated as  the Community's  own resources).  The deficiency between
this income  and expenditure  is made up as necessary from direct
contributions by member governments, assessed as  the yield of a standard
value-added tax.  These direct payments  are not, however, unlimited.  From
81970 until 1985  the limit was  the yield of a one per cent VAT.  The main
expenditure commitments of the EEC  is  for  the Common Agricultural Policy
which has taken from two thirds  to three quarters  of the total budget.  Part
of these payments  are  for structural  improvement but, contrary to  earlier
intentions,  the so-called guidance  section has remained a small part of the
commitment.  The bulk of the payment is  for price support.  In the early
days  of the  CAP following price harmonization in  the Sixties  and early
Seventies, there was absolutely no budgetary problem because the  EEC was  in
deficit in most major commodities.  Hence,  the CAP was a revenue  earner.
Lots of  import levies were generated and there was  little need for export
subsidies.  This situation, however, changed more rapidly than was  expected.
Soaring production and stagnant, in some  cases declining, consumption made
the  EEC increasingly a net exporter of dairy products, sugar, beef, wheat
and then all cereals.  Even the  entry of the United Kingdom, the major
importer, provided only a temporary respite.  Soon the UK too was visibly
busily contributing to  the  surplus and is now indeed a substantial cereal
exporter.  The broad pattern since  1967 has been that production has been
rising at two per cent a year but consumption only at  .5  per cent.
The  consequent pressure on the budget for increased exports was
temporarily alleviated by the commodity boom of 1973  to 1975  and then by the
headroom given by the one per cent VAT entitlement.  By the  end of the
Nineteen Seventies, however, this headroom was getting uncomfortably low and
for  three years, between 1979  and 1981, there was  a period of prudent price
setting.  In real terms, that  is  to say relative  to input prices, prices
were cut by three per  cent a year as  compared to  the more normal  trend cut
of  1.5 per cent a year.  This  austerity, however, could not be maintained,
9and in 1982  there was an explosion in prices.  The effect of this on the
budget was  for a time delayed by unusually high world prices but the  crunch
came  in 1983 when projected spending became greater than projected income.
Since  that time  FEOGA, the agricultural section of the Treasury, has
staggered from crisis  to  crisis.  It has remained solvent only by rolling
back expenditure  from year to  year, obtaining supplementary payments  (at
great cost to  the power and prestige of the  Commission), under the counter
price  cuts,  for example by restricting the availability of intervention, and
by the providential  strengthening of the  dollar.
This  period of financial difficulty has produced several  changes in CAP
arrangements.  Some of these,  for example the  threshold controls  on price,
have been much trumpeted, but are  probably not very important  in practice.
Others,  in particular the  reduction of effective prices by administrative
limits on intervention, though less publicized, have been quite  important'in
reducing prices.  There has also,  of course, been one change of considerable
importance both politically and in its  practical  effects, that  is  the
introduction of dairy quotas  in 1984.  This meant that the commitment to
dairying support, always the most expensive  of commodities, was no longer
open ended.  Sugar, another expensive commodity, was already subject  to
quota.  This leaves cereals as  the main problem commodity from a budgetary
viewpoint.  By 1990  the export surplus  of cereals  is  likely  to reach sixty
million tonnes.  A common view is  that the maximum it will be politically
possible to  export  is  twenty five million tonnes.  So unless there  is  some
curtailment of production there will be an expensive  growth stockpile.
In 1985,  after considerable  and protracted negotiation, the VAT ceiling
has been lifted from one  to  1.4 per cent.  This however has not taken the
10budgetary pressure off the Commission and Council of Ministers as  much as  it
might at first sight  appear.  Part of this extra revenue  is  intended to
accommodate the  need of Spain and Portugal who joined the  Community in
January  1986.  A further part is  intended to allow some  expansion of EEC
non-agricultural policies.  Finally, as  a quid pro quo,  the Council of
Agricultural Ministers will be  subject to  closer scrutiny  from the  Council
of Financial Ministers  than was previously the case.  The broad intention of
new control mechanisms  introduced is  that  EEC expenditure shall  not grow
faster than GNP.
The Likely Response to  Continued Budgetary Pressure
In my view more restrictive pricing of cereals will be  forces on the
Community.  This  is  likely  to happen even in the absence of much lower world
prices.  In the presence of these  it will be unavoidable although the
difficulties experienced in obtaining even modest cuts at  the  last  two price
reviews  indicate that this will not be  achieved without struggle.  A cut in
the price of cereals would be not only financially helpful but good from
equity and efficiency viewpoints.  There are, however, other possible
budgetary solutions.
Perhaps  the most likely alternative would be  to seek to  increase the
revenue  of the Community by imposing a tax on oilseeds and products.  This
was mooted in 1983.
From a purely budgetary point of view this route has  a number of
attractions.  It would not only bring in much needed revenue but would also
curtail expenditure under other heads.  By making the  use of soya bean meal
as  a direct energy source and as  a compliment  to cassava less attractive,
it would reduce  the need  to subsidize cereal exports;  beef, poultry and
11pigmeat production would also be curtailed, with again some saving  in export
restitution, via the  effect on oil prices, consumption of butter would be
stimulated  (an important advantage given the quotas have built in a 15  per
cent production surplus);  the prospective cost of the  Spanish olive oil
surplus would be reduced.
The efficiency effects  of such a move  are not clear cut.  On second
best arguments  one might make a case for equal restraints  on cereals and
oilseed meals  (and also  incidentally cereal substitutes).  In terms  of
equity, however, the  results would be largely bad.  However, it will be
neither of these considerations  that will prevent such a move but rather
that too many national  interests would be  adversely affected.  This option
one may expect therefore  to be raised and discussed at  some  length, but not
implemented.
SUMMARY
In the  recent past, U.S. policies,  especially as  they affect exchange
rates, have  reinforced rather than threatened the Common Agricultural
Policy.
The desirable  effect of possible future  lower world cereal prices
brought by changed U.S. policies should be to  combine a large cut in cereal
prices with a switch  to more  direct forms of income  support.  This  is
justified on the  grounds of both equity and efficiency.
This  is unlikely  to happen since budgetary problems  rather than
considerations of equity, efficiency or  effectiveness  are what have  induced
change  in the CAP.
The budgetary problems which have emerged in  the Nineteen Eighties
largely  through the expansion of exports relative  to  imports,  will continue
12to  plague the Community.  They will increasingly centre  on cereals.  The
likely result will be  a harsher cereal pricing policy but  one unlikely to be
harsh enough to  avoid further financial crises  or confrontations with more
traditional exporters.
A possible alternative budgetary solution would be  a tax on oilseeds.
Despite  the broad exchequer advantages of such a move  it will be prevented
because too many national interests would be  adversely affected.
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